This study focuses on the prediction of the engagement of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in environmental management practices, based on a random sample of 689 SMEs. The study finds that several endogenous factors, including tangibility of sector, firm size, innovative orientation, family influence and perceived financial benefits from energy conservation, predict an SME’s level of engagement in selected environmental management practices. For family influence, this effect is found only in interaction with the number of owners. In addition to empirical (...) research on SMEs’ environmental behavior, this article draws on the ecological modernization literature as well as the theory of planned behavior. (shrink)

In this study, we propose and test a model of the effects of organizational ethical culture and organizational architecture on the perceived unethical behavior of employees towards customers. This study also examines the relationship between organizational ethical culture and moral acceptability judgment, hypothesizing that moral acceptability judgment is an important stage in the ethical decision-making process. Based on a field study in one of the largest financial institutions in Europe, we found that organizational ethical culture was significantly related to the (...) perceived frequency of unethical behavior towards customers and to the moral acceptability judgment of this type of unethical behavior. No support was found for the claim that features of organizational architecture are associated with the perceived frequency of unethical behavior towards customers. This is the first study to document the differential effects of organizational architecture and organizational ethical culture on perceived unethical behavior of employees towards customers, in wholesale banking. Implications for managers and future research are discussed. (shrink)

Preparing the Next Generation of Oral Historians is an invaluable resource to educators seeking to bring history alive for students at all levels. Filled with insightful reflections on teaching oral history, it offers practical suggestions for educators seeking to create curricula, engage students, gather community support, and meet educational standards. By the close of the book, readers will be able to successfully incorporate oral history projects in their own classrooms.

To examine the influence of hypnotic suggestibility testing as a source of individual differences in hypnotic responsiveness, we compared behavioral and subjective responses on three scales of hypnotic suggestibility: The Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A . Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility. Berlin: Consulting Psychologists Press); the Carleton University Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale . The Carleton University Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale: Normative data and psychometric properties. Psychological Reports, 53, 523–535); and the Group Scale of Hypnotic Ability . (...) The Group Scale of Hypnotic Ability and response booklet. Australian Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 27, 20–31). Behavioral and subjective responses to the CURSS were significantly different than those on the HGSHS: A and GSHA. More participants were classified as “low suggestible” on the CURSS and they reported subjective experiences more similar to everyday mentation. Attitudes and expectancies of participants who received the GSHA were less predictive of responding, but rates of responding and subjective experiences were similar on the GSHA and the HGSHS: A. Discussion focuses on implications for the use of group hypnotic suggestibility scales. (shrink)

Political theorist Wendy Brown has argued recently that contemporary neoliberalism, with its relentless obsession on the economy, has all but undone the tenets of democracy. This book suggests one way of thinking out of the current moment, and it does so by looking to a perhaps unlikely figure: Niccolo Machiavelli. Ronald J. Schmidt, Jr. argues that if we imitate Machiavelli's interpretive method in reading The Prince and Discourses of Livy, we can find in them solutions to the neoliberal (...) problems Brown warns about. (shrink)

J. Richard Gott III (1993) has used the “Copernican principle” to derive a probability density function for the total longevity of any phenomenon, based solely on the phenomenon’s past longevity. John Leslie (1996) and others have used an apparently similar probabilistic argument, the “Doomsday Argument,” to claim that conventional predictions of longevity must be adjusted, based on Bayes’ Theorem, in favor of shorter longevities. Here I show that Gott’s arguments are flawed and contradictory, but that one of his conclusions—his delta (...) t formula—is mathematically equivalent to Laplace’s famous (and notorious) ‘rule of succession’; moreover, Gott’s delta t formula is a plausible worst-case (if one favors greater longevity) bound in some contexts. On the other hand, the Doomsday Argument is fallacious: the argument’s Bayesian formalism is stated in terms of total duration, but all attempted real-life applications of the argument—with one exception, an application by Gott 1994—actually plug in prior probabilities for future duration; moreover, the Self-Sampling Assumption, an essential premise of the Doomsday Argument, is contradicted by the prior information in all known real-life cases. But rejecting the Doomsday Argument does not entail rejecting the possibility of learning about the future from the past. Applying the work of Bruce M. Hill (1968, 1988, 1993) and Frank P.A. Coolen (1998, 2006) in the field of non-parametric predictive inference, I propose and defend an alternative methodology for quantifying how past longevity of any phenomenon does provide evidence for future longevity. In so doing, I identify an objective standard by which to choose among counting time intervals, counting population, or counting any other measure of past longevity in predicting future longevity. This methodology forms the basis of a calculus of induction. (shrink)

This introduction sets the stage for the Special Issue and the manuscripts that follow. Interest in work hours, work intensification and work addiction has grown over the past decade. Several factors have come together to increase hours spent at work, the nature of work itself, and motivations for working hard, particularly among managers and professionals. The introduction first reviews some of the known causes and consequences of long work hours and the intensification of work. A case is then made as (...) to why individuals, families, organizations and society should care about hours spent at work and work addiction. Individuals and organizations have some choice here. Most employees would in fact prefer to work fewer hours though few actually realize their preferences. This collection lays out these choices and hopefully encourages thought and discussion of their merits. Long work hours and work addiction harms individuals and their families and does not make organizations more effective. The introduction concludes with a brief summary of the diverse contributions of an international group of leading researchers in this area. (shrink)

R M HARE HAS CLAIMED THAT ALL NATURALISTIC ETHICAL\nTHEORIES ARE INCORRECT BECAUSE THEY FAIL TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF\nTHE COMMENDING FUNCTION OF ETHICAL TERMS. BUT HARE ASSUMES\nTHE POINT AT ISSUE BY SUPPOSING THAT NO DEFINING\nCHARACTERISTICS COULD THEMSELVES BE TAKEN AS COMMENDATORY.\nIF 'X IS GOOD' IS TAKEN TO MEAN 'AN INFORMED,\nDISINTERESTED, RATIONAL, NORMAL HUMAN SPECTATOR WOULD\nAPPROVE OF X', THEN THE DEFINIENS WOULD BE JUST AS\nCOMMENDATORY AS THE DEFINIENDUM.

This comprehensive Gandhi reader provides an essential new reference for scholars and students of his life and thought. It is the only text available that presents Gandhi's own writings, including excerpts from three of his books—An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth, Satyagraha in South Africa, Hind Swaraj —a major pamphlet, Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place, and many journal articles and letters, along with a biographical sketch of his life in historical context and recent essays by highly (...) regarded scholars. (shrink)

In many traditional, small-scale societies, death and other misfortunes are commonly explained as a result of others’ malign occult agency. Here, we call this family of epistemic tendencies “the agential view of misfortune.” After reviewing several ethnographic case studies that illustrate this view, we argue that its origins and stability are puzzling from an evolutionary perspective. Not only is the agential view of misfortune false; it imposes costs on individuals and social groups that seem to far outweigh whatever benefits the (...) view might provide. We thus doubt that the agential view of misfortune is explainable in terms of adaptive effects. However, neither does it seem readily explainable as a consequence of belief formation strategies that are on the whole adaptive (as is plausibly the case for certain other of our false beliefs, including some that are costly). Accordingly, we contend that the commonness of the agential view of misfortune demands a special evolutionary explanation of some kind. We provide a partial explanation of this phenomenon by highlighting the adaptive benefits that often flow to occult specialists in environments where the agential view of misfortune is entrenched. What this does not explain, however, is the general lack of resistance we observe in response to occultists’ exploitative behaviours over (cultural) evolutionary timescales. We conclude by canvassing a few possible explanations for this puzzling lack of resistance, and while we commit ourselves to none, we do find one option more promising than the others. (shrink)

There is growing acceptance among language evolution researchers that an increase in our ancestors’ theory of mind capacities was critical to the origins of language. However, little attention has been paid to the question of how those capacities were in fact upgraded. This article develops a novel hypothesis, grounded in contemporary cognitive neuroscience, on which our theory of mind capacities improved as a result of an increase in our System-2 thinking capacities, in turn based in an increase in our working (...) memory capacities. I contrast this hypothesis with what would appear to be the default position among language evolution researchers, namely, that our theory of mind became more powerful as a result of genetic change to a domain-specific mindreading system which we share with other great apes. While the latter hypothesis is not implausible, it arguably enjoys less empirical support at present than does the alternative hypothesis I develop. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel and the Problem of Beginning: Scepticism and Presuppositionlessness by Robb DUNPHYJ. M. FritzmanDUNPHY, Robb. Hegel and the Problem of Beginning: Scepticism and Presuppositionlessness. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2023. x + 213 pp. Cloth, $105.00This rich, learned, and important book investigates and critically evaluates how, according to Hegel, philosophy should begin. Briefly stated, the problem of beginning philosophy is that any beginning seems susceptible to a skeptical (...) challenge that takes the form of a dilemma. On the one side, if philosophy begins immediately with a presuppositionless assertion, skeptics will contend that it is dogmatic. On the other side, if philosophy begins mediately with a claim that presupposes an argument, skeptics will confront each premise of that argument with a trilemma: The premise is either only a dogmatic assertion; it is the conclusion of an argument whose premises must in turn be justified (which threatens an infinite regress); or it depends on an argument that is viciously circular. Hegel solves this problem with a beginning that is simultaneously immediate and mediate.The introduction explains that this book has three goals. First, it critically analyzes the problem of beginning, showing how Hegel responds to the skeptical challenge. Second, it explains how Hegel’s approach to the problem and his solution are informed by his deep engagement with the tradition of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Finally, it provides a guide to reading Hegel’s essay “With What Must the Beginning of the Science be Made?” in the Science of Logic.Chapter 1, “Hegel and Pyrrhonian Scepticism,” presents the essentials of Pyrrhonism and Hegel’s interpretation of it. Pyrrhonism is a way of life. It aims to find an equally good counterargument for every argument it encounters, thus leading to a suspension of judgment that allows the skeptic to live in a state of undisturbedness. Pyrrhonism presents encountered arguments with a trilemma: Either they depend on dogmatic assertions; they generate an infinite regress of arguments; or they are viciously circular. Hegel’s interpretation emphasizes skepticism’s equipollence, whereby it opposes every argument with a counterargument that is equally persuasive. Viewed historically, Pyrrhonism seems to have confronted arguments only as it happened to encounter them and to have restricted itself to epistemology. However, Hegel is open to the interpretation that skepticism’s inquiry could be completed. This would allow it to demonstrate that for every argument there will always be an [End Page 143] equally persuasive counterargument. He also interprets skepticism as accepting a metaphysical principle regarding the inherent instability of objects.“A Short History of the Problem of Beginning,” chapter 2, provides a detailed précis of Hegel’s essay. It also gives the brief history of the problem of beginning, discussing Descartes, Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling. It notes that some philosophers posit an objective beginning, others a subjective beginning. It explains why Hegel regards previous attempts to solve the problem of beginning as inadequate. It recognizes that Fichte’s solution can be interpreted as much closer to that of Hegel than Hegel acknowledges.Chapter 3, “The Problem of Beginning,” supplies Hegel’s own account of the problem. His solution has two versions, one in the Science of Logic and the other in the Encyclopedia Logic. Each version posits a beginning without determinate content. In the Science of Logic, Hegel states that absolute knowing, the culminating shape of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, corresponds to the empty thinking with which philosophy begins. Philosophy’s beginning in the Science of Logic is mediate as it emerges from the progression of shapes of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit and immediate as it does not have an object of thought. In the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel proposes that a completed skepticism corresponds to the abstract concept of being with which philosophy begins. Philosophy’s beginning in the Encyclopedia Logic is mediate as it emerges from the skepticism’s equipollence and immediate as being without content. Hegel ultimately denies that a completed skepticism could play this role, however, which suggests that he believes that philosophy can begin immediately.“Meditation I—Phenomenology,” chapter 4, argues that Hegel’s first version is unsuccessful. To succeed, William Maker’s interpretation would have to be accepted, which... (shrink)

The status of genes as bearers of semantic content remains very much in dispute among philosophers of biology. In a series of papers, Nicholas Shea has argued that his ‘infotel’ theory of semantics vindicates the claim that genes carry semantic content. On Shea’s account, each organism is associated with a ‘developmental system’ that takes genetic representations as inputs and produces whole-organism traits as outputs. Moreover, at least in his most recent work on the topic, Shea is explicit in claiming that (...) these genetic representations are ‘read in ontogenetic time, in the course of individual development’. Here I argue that a close examination of the process of reading, in Shea’s sense, reveals that acts of reading do not actually occur over the course of developmental time at all. To make this vivid, I contrast the process of reading for Shea with another type of developmental process that is widely seen as a form of reading directed on inherited genes, and which certainly does occur over the course of developmental time, namely, gene expression. I suggest that this error in Shea’s thinking can be traced back to an equivocation on Shea’s part in the meaning of ‘reads’, and also to a reliance on an invalid principle regarding the transference of representational content from one token gene to another. The issues at play are bound up with questions about causation and in particular about causation over time. Thus, having first presented my arguments in a way that doesn’t depend on any particular theory of causation, I then make use of Kenneth Waters’ framework of difference-making causation to conceptually sharpen and shed further light on matters. I conclude by discussing a consequence of the fact that acts of reading do not occur in development. 1 Introduction2 Reading for Shea3 Gene Expression as Reading4 Are Genetic Representations Read in Development? Part 15 The Manipulability Theory of Causation and Difference-Making Causation6 Are Genetic Representations Read in Development? Part 27 Conclusion. (shrink)

While available to a multitude, routine health precautions and basic, nonspecialized medical services are lacking in many societies. This may in part be the outcome of attitudinal distortions, not only at the national and global levels, but fundamentally within the patient-physician encounter. Demands for a disturbance-free subsistence clash with values of power and control within health-care sub-systems resulting in an overall neglect of primary needs and a distribution of medical services that benefits select groups. True needs are misrepresented and an (...) intensification of particular services does not fulfill one''s duties toward those who realize little or no services at all. The entire institutional system of medicine requires a rebalancing of rights, intentions and outcomes, beginning with the correlative experiences of patient and physician. (shrink)

Residency training in the Netherlands is to be restructured over the coming years. To this end a general competence profile for medical specialists has been introduced. This profile is nearly the same as the Canadian CanMEDS 2000 model, which describes seven general areas of medical specialist competence, one of which is professionalism. In order to establish a training programme for residents and their instructors based on this competence, it is necessary to develop a vision that does justice to everyday (...) medical practice. The two most prevailing views of professionalism—as personal, or as a behavioural characteristic—fall short of this. Only when professionalism is understood as reflective professionalism does it encompass the fundamental contextuality of medical treatment. This means that the focus of training and assessment must be shifted to accountability for treatment. (shrink)

A new description of gravitational motion will be proposed. It is part of the proper time formulation of physics as presented on the IARD 2000 conference. According to this formulation the proper time of an object is taken as its fourth coordinate. As a consequence, one obtains a circular space–time diagram where distances are measured with the Euclidean metric. The relativistic factor turns out to be of simple goniometric origin. It further follows that the Lagrangian for gravitational dynamics does (...) not require an interpretation in terms of curvature of space–time. The flat space model for gravitational dynamics leads to the correct predictions for the bending of light, the perihelion shift of Mercury and gravitational red-shift. The new theory is free of singularities. More important, the new formulation of gravitational dynamics restores the validity of the principle of addition of potentials. One therefore can find solutions for static gravitational configurations for which it is difficult to find the solution of the corresponding Einstein equations. The method will be illustrated by means of the orbital precession for non-spherical stellar mass distributions. In case of the bipole mass distribution the agreement with the predictions of the general theory of relativity is very striking. Nevertheless, the new model is far more simple. (shrink)

Our interest in this paper is to drive a wedge of contention between two different programs that fall under the umbrella of “experimental philosophy”. In particular, we argue that experimental philosophy’s “negative program” presents almost as significant a challenge to its “positive program” as it does to more traditional analytic philosophy.

L'eschatologie a marqué la théologie chrétienne du XXe siècle. Initiateur en ce domaine, R. Bultmann entreprend une herméneutique « existentiale » et « démythologisante » de la prédication apocalyptique de Jésus, mise en lumière par J. Weiss et A. Schweitzer : en Jésus Dieu prononce la parole définitive qui m'appelle aujourd'hui à la décision de foi et à l'existence authentique. La théologie apprend ainsi à parler de Dieu avec sens en parlant de l'homme. Avec J. Moltmann, le futur est désenclavé (...) du présent où le laissait Bultmann, et l'eschatologie se fait résolument christologique en même temps qu'historique ; mais le passage de la Théologie de l’espérance au Dieu crucifié pose le problème redoutable du lien entre l’horizon de l’espérance et l'histoire abandonnée à la souffrance. Pour J. Moingt, la résurrection, fondement de la christologie, permet de relire la vie de Jésus comme l’histoire de Dieu menant avec les hommes depuis la création le combat eschatologique de la vie contre la mort.La pensée eschatologique s’élabore aussi dans la ligne des théologiens de l'histoire. O. Cullmann fait du Christ le centre de l’histoire du salut, entre un « déjà là » et un « pas encore ». Avec plus d’ambition mais aussi d’ambiguïté, W. Pannenberg situe la résurrection de Jésus, en tant qu’événement historique, au regard de l'histoire universelle dont elle anticipe la fin. La pensée eschatologique ne laisse pas de travailler également d’autres théologies, davantage marquées par les problématiques traditionnelles.Twentieth century Christian theology has been marked by eschatology. R. Bultmann, initiator in this field, underlook an “existential” and “demythologising” hermeneutic of the apocalyptic preaching of Jesus, which had been brought. to light by J. Weiss and A. Schweitzer : in Jesus God pronounces the definitive word that calls me to a decision of faith and authentic existence today. Theology thus learns to speak of God with meaning by speaking of man. With J. Moltmann, the future is freed from present, where Bultmann had left it, and eschatology became resolutely Christological at the same time as historical. But the passage from the Theology of Hope to the Crucified God poses the difficult problem of the connection between the horizon of hope and history left to suffering. For J. Moingt, the resurrection, foundation of Christology, permits a rereading of the life of Jesus as the history of God, who, from the time of creation, leads humanity in the eschatological combat of life against death.Eschatological thought also develops in the direction of theologies of history. O. Cullmann makes Christ the center of the history of salvation, between an “already here” and a “not yet”. With greater ambition but also ambiguity, W Pannenberg places the resurrection of Jesus as a historical event, in comparison with universal history, of which it anticipates the end. Eschatological thought does not fail to also influence others theologies, more marked by traditional problematics. (shrink)

Xavier Zubiri arouses a growing interest as a philosopher. It is, however, well known that he has also treated theological themes; he was concerned especially with the theology of the eucharist. Zubiri was convinced that the most precise concept of the eucharistic transformation was not the «transubstantiation» but «transubstantivation» and «transactualisation». In exposing Zubiri's conviction we meet two fundamental concepts of his philosophy: substantivity and actuality . Yet, to understand adequately these two concepts, it is necessary, it would seem, to (...) start from another fondamental concept of Zubiri: the sentient intelligence . For this reason the article intends, in the first place, to present the Zubirian concept of sentient intelligence, substantivity and actuality, in order, thereafter, to expose the concept of the eucharistic transformation as transubstantivation and transactualisation. Zubiri says that he does not claim to say new things about the eucharist, but only to conceive in his own way the things said before. In agreement with him, the article tries to show that, if one starts from his concept of human intelligence as sentient intelligence, human intellection will be primarily «actuality», the real will be «substantivity», and the adequate concept of the eucharistic transformation will be «transubstantivati. (shrink)

In Poetics chapter 9, Aristotle famously claims that poetry is more philosophical than history. What does this mean? I argue that he is talking about the metaphysics of events. Poets seek causal coherence among the events in their stories. Historians must report what happened whether or not the events of history exhibit causal coherence. This makes the poet's job more philosophical than the historian's, for the poet is seeking a unified plot -- an action-type -- that serves as the (...) backbone of the story he is trying to tell. The poet's final script is a token of an Aristotelian universal, the universal being an action-type that could have been fleshed out in many different ways, although with similar characters. Hence, the poet shows us what he thinks it is likely or necessary for agents of different types to do in the circumstances that confront them. Aristotelian mimesis, on this account, is the poetic representation of "one action," that is, of one action-type. (shrink)

In the management and business ethics literatures, stakeholder engagement has been demonstrated to lead to more ethical management practices. However, there may be limits on the extent to which stakeholder engagement can, as currently conceptualized, resolve some of the more difficult ethical challenges faced by managers. In this paper we argue that stakeholder engagement, when seen as a way of reducing five types of knowledge problems—risk, ambiguity, complexity, equivocality, and a priori irreducible uncertainty—can aid managers in resolving such ethical challenges. (...) Using a practical illustration of the ethical challenges surrounding the development and application of genetic modification technologies, we demonstrate how stakeholder engagement enables managers to better address these knowledge problems, thereby to manage more ethically. In this way, we suggest that stakeholder engagement has an even more crucial role to play in business ethics research and practice. (shrink)

We offer obeisances to Lord Śiva, guru of knowledge, lord of the dance, who purifies by the very utterance of his name, who transcends all dualities. May he grant us permission to argue with his devotees. May he also give us his blessings to convince them.Properly speaking, comparative philosophy does not lead toward the creation of a synthesis of philosophical traditions. What is being created is not a new theory but a different sort of philosopher. The goal of comparative (...) philosophy is learning a new language, a new way of talking. The comparative philosopher does not so much inhabit both of the standpoints represented by the traditions from which he draws as he comes to inhabit an.. (shrink)

Gallop's criticisms are so extensive and so vigorous that one may wonder how he could mean it when he praises my book in the ways he does at the beginning and end of his notice. In the hope of making it believable that some at least of the praise is deserved, I will try to show that much of the criticism is not as damaging as it may at first appear. Most of what I say will be of a (...) rather general nature, and that is perhaps unfortunate when Gallop has gone into so many interesting questions of detail; but one of my general defences will be that this discussion of particular questions not only does not, but could not, support the objection that the decision procedure that is illustrated in the book is incapable of dealing with all too many of the moral dilemmas an average person is likely to have to face. (shrink)

The author here constructs a system of simple type theory in which the type hierarchy does not extend merely to any finite height, but to an infinite height; this added part allows him to prove the existence of infinite sets within the theory, instead of taking it as an axiom in the usual simple type theory. The system has been presented in such sufficient generality so as to make it able to accommodate current scientific theories; the author has turned (...) in the direction of using type theory rather than set theory as the underlying logic of scientific theories. The system is formalized in Church's lambda-calculus notation; the semantics of the system are treated in great detail and appear to be the most complete study so far in print. The system is shown to contain at each type a "basic logic" somewhat similar to first-order logic; the author also shows that Peano's axioms for arithmetic appear as theorems when cast in suitable form. This book is one of a number of recent studies of type theory; together they represent a revival of interest in the subject, both as a foundation for mathematics and as an object of interest in itself. The book stems from Andrews' Princeton doctoral thesis.—P. J. M. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ALBERTUS MAGNUS AND THE NOTION OF SYLLOGISTIC MIDDLE TERM J. M. HUBBARD College of St. Thomas St. Paul, Minnesota ABERT THE GREAT is recognized as one of the great scientific minds of the Middle A:ges, both for his commentaries on Aristotle's scientific works and for his own contributions to the study of nature. His contributions to the science of logic go largely unnoticed, however. This is probably due to (...) the ascendency of the Summulae tradition in medieval logic a.bout the time of Albert's death, for the Summulae traidition is quite different from the one represented in his commentaries on the logical writings of Aristotle. I should like to remedy this a bit by looking at how he understands the concept of middle term in Aristotle's Prior Analytics. There are two points with which we can begin this study. First, Albert insists that Ar.istotle's remark that second and third figure syllogisms are imperfect when compared to those of the first figure does not mean that they somehow lack the necessity cha.racteristic of syHogisms of the first figure. On the contra;ry, all syllogisms, in whatever figure, conclude necessa,rily. This is what it is to be a syllogism. First figure syllogisms are perfect with respect to us, for in them the necessity of consequence, which is the very na;bure of the syllogism, is manifest to us in a way that it is not in syllogisms of the second and third figures. Hence, the marks perfect and imperfeot refer not to the syllogisms in themselves but to the syUogisms in relation to us.1 1 Albertus Magnus, Oommentares CYn the Prior Analytics, Bk. I, Tr. 1, Ch. 8, pp. 469-71. See also Tr. 1, Ch. 6, p. 467, and Tr. 1, Chs. 5 and 6. Page 115 116 J. M. HUBBARD Seoond, the notion of syllogism is coextensive with the notion of middle term, for the middle term is the root and cause of the necessity that characterizes the syllogism. This is why some other kinds of argument, induction and example for instance, are not syllogisms strictly speaking, but only in a loose and improper sense; they lack a true middle term.2 What is it, then, to be a middle term of a syllogism on Albert's reading of Aristotle? Is the middle term middle in some quantitative sense, then? Although Albert uses the expressions scope, breadth, contain, etc., he is quite explicit that the notions of figure and term are transferred " metaphorically " from quantity to properly logical considerations.8 For logic deails not with quantity and its relations, but with relations that exist between things as conceived by the mind, the most fundamental of which is the relation of predica.bility. To be predicable is to be sayable of many things, and although a predicable can be considered a whole in relation to the things of which it is said (its parts then), such talk is metaphorical and not literal. A predicable (whole) is sayable of many things but is not constituted by them. Dog, for instance, is sayable of Fido and Rover, but being a dog is not being Fido and Rover. A whole in the ordinary sense, on the other hand, is not sayable of its parts and is composed of them. One could not say that a wall is a house, but a house is composed, among other things, of a wall. The notions of figure and term, and therefore of middle term, are taken from the quantitative aspects of things and trans£erred to properly logical things. This being so, the notion of middle term cannot be reduced to something quantatative, spatial organization for example. From these remarks one can anticipate how Albert would respond to the suggestion that the middle term is the one that is middle in universality with respect to the other two. This references will be to Oommentaria in Prioru.m A.nalytiooru.m in Opera Omnia, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris: Vives, 1890), Vol. 1. 2 Bk. II, Tr. 7, Ch. 4, p. 794. a Bk. I, Tr. I, Ch. 2, pp. 460-61. ALBERTUS MAGNUS AND THE MIDDLE TERM 117 would... (shrink)

In his book, An Introduction to Christian Philosophy, Mr. Spier demonstrated his ability to give a compact exposition of the philosophy of Hermann Dooyeweerd. And now within comparatively few pages, Mr. Spier ex-posits and criticizes Existentialism, a movement noted for its obscurity and verbosity. Mr. Spier's work is of an introductory nature and does not intend to give an exhaustive account. The merit of his clear exposition and criticism is for the reader to judge. -Translator's Preface.

It is a major move from the claim that the core linguistic problem in Broca's aphasia is the inability to deal with traces, to the claim that this is the syntactic operation only and that it is exclusively supported by Broca's region. Three arguments plead against this move. First, many Broca patients have no damage to Broca's area. Second, it is not only passive, but also active jabberwocky sentences that activate the frontal operculum in a judgment task. Third, the same (...) area is involved in a phrase-building production task that does not require tense processing. (shrink)

Many people seem to find it quite impossible to doubt that if a person did not do something freely, then he can be neither praised nor blamed for doing it. This assumption is shared by people with very different views about freedom, determinism and moral responsibility. It is held by most ‘libertarians’, who, to preserve moral responsibility, reject determinism. It is held by ‘hard determinists’, who accept determinism and therefore reject moral responsibility; and it is held by ‘soft determinists’, who (...) accept determinism, but argue that determinism does not exclude any kind of freedom that is relevant to whether a person may be held responsible. (shrink)

Medical decision making relies heavily on the notion of the quality of a person's life in providing a reason to utilize one therapy over another or to withhold certain therapies altogether. The concept of quality of life, however, lacks clear definition as well as consensus on its constitutive elements. ;Chapter one engages a basic controversy in the literature: whether 'quality of life' should be understood as a subjective concept, or whether objective "lists" can help us assess a person's quality of (...) life. Chapter two examines whether anthropological data might provide guidance. While it is often argued that anthropological data supports relativism, John Finnis argues that anthropological data supports universalism which, in turn, bolsters objectivist claims. I argue that anthropological data may plausibly be interpreted to support either subjective or objective accounts, and thus, does not settle our approach to quality of life. ;Chapter Three examines objective list theories, in particular those of Bernard Gert and John Finnis. I find Gert's account to be problematic because it seems incomplete. Finnis's criteria, too, seems ultimately indefensible. Thus, I conclude that while objectivist claims may offer insight into human values and motivations, existing accounts are flawed. Chapter Four examines subjective accounts of quality of life. I focus on "preference satisfaction" accounts. While these accounts provide intuitively plausible descriptions, they fall victim to a host of difficulties. Perhaps the best example of this is the "fleeting preferences" problem, which undermines our confidence in making life-and-death decisions on the basis of quality of life considerations. ;The concluding chapter offers that much progress can be made by understanding quality of life in terms of finding meaning in life. Thus, the quality of one's life is determined by how much purpose and meaning is found in that life. While this notion is not without its problems, it does capture the complex elements of the kinds of cases in which we are particularly interested, and combines some of the best features of both the objective and subjective accounts. (shrink)

This article discusses Habermas' rejections of the orthodoxy of the philosophy of history, ethical socialism, and scientism. It urges that his attempt to derive rationality and morality from consensus fails, and so he does lapse into ethical socialism. However, ethical socialism only appears to be something to avoidbecause of his belief that consensus could generate rationality and morality. Once the impossibility of that is recognized, ethical socialism can be rehabilitated. Hence, Althusser's version of ethical socialism escapes Habermas' censure.

The natural name theory, recently discussed by Johnson (2018), is proposed as an explanation of pure quotation where the quoted term(s) refers to a linguistic object such as in the sentence ‘In the above, ‘bank’ is ambiguous’. After outlining the theory, I raise a problem for the natural name theory. I argue that positing a resemblance relation between the name and the linguistic object it names does not allow us to rule out cases where the natural name fails to (...) resemble the linguistic object it names. I argue that to avoid this problem, we can combine the natural name theory with a type-realist metaphysics of language, and hold that the name is natural because the name is an instance of the kind that it names. I conclude by reflecting on the importance of the metaphysics of language for questions in the philosophy of language. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.2 (2003) 133-134 [Access article in PDF] Fictional Beings J. M. Coetzee What Does It Mean, "To Understand"? A tennis coach is teaching a young player a forehand topspin drive. He does so with a mixture of demonstrations (nonverbal) and explanations (verbal), such as, "At the moment of impact you roll the wrist over like this" (demonstrates). The player tries the stroke again (...) and again, and each time the coach shakes his head and says, "You haven't got it yet." Then the player gets the stroke right. The coach says "Now you've got it! Now you understand! Now let's do it again!"Is this a legitimate use of the word understand? I think it is. The coach intends the following: At first you may have understood my words but from your actions—the practice strokes you played—I could not see that you had understood my meaning. Then, when you got the stroke right, and could repeat it, I saw that you had finally understood the meaning behind my words.Understanding is in this case the effective translation of words, or words plus demonstrations, into actions, where effectiveness can be easily measured. The translation is from a verbal, or mixed verbal, system into an entirely nonverbal system of electrochemical impulses.Conversely, one can picture an exhaustive analysis of forehand topspin drives by André Agassi, conducted by microphotography, implanted sensors, and so on, to issue in a mixed verbal and diagrammatic account of how Agassi plays the stroke. In this case the physiologic system of the stroke has been successfully translated into a (partially) verbal system. Again, it would be meaningful to say that the sports physiologist who does the analysis has come to understand how the stroke is played.Although in both these cases understanding is conceived of as a translation process, I concentrate from here onward on the translation process from the verbal to the nonverbal, exemplified by understanding how to play a particular stroke.The coach says X and the player tries to "do" X, but fails and fails, until finally he succeeds. When the player has at last "done" X, he has understood. Thereafter, by steps, the player ceases to depend on the coach and the coach's X: the player can do X by himself; he understands X in the sense that whenever he says X to himself he can do X. He has made X his own.I read The Sound and the Fury, the part devoted to Benjy. Benjy says X and I don't understand. I understand the words on the page one by one, many of the sentences I understand one by one in the sense that I can translate them into other English sentences, but I don't understand the logic that gets Benjy from one sentence to the next, I don't understand the references of many words that are usually referential, and sometimes I am baffled by the syntax.For whatever reason, I go on reading Benjy. In a few respects I begin to understand better. For instance, there are sentences that stop in midstride, and I begin to suspect that such sentences stop because Benjy does not want to think what [End Page 133] comes next—that is to say, that the Faulkner behind Benjy means me to understand that Benjy lacks the wherewithal to face what would naturally come next. Mainly, however, I remain in the dark.Then I begin to experience something interesting. I find that I am, in my mind, going through some of the movements of Benjy's language. I am, as it were, practicing the characteristic strokes of his game. Although I remain, for the most part, unable to translate his pages into connected discourse—that is, into a discourse in which the logical connection between one sentence and the next is, however faulty, at least clear—I am better and better able to "do" Benjy."Doing" Benjy in this case means more than parrot-like repetition of Benjy's words. I can now speak of "entering Benjy" in a way that makes sense. I... (shrink)

Editor-in-Chief John Harris discusses the four events that remind us of the concerns about what happens before birth and after death.Four recent events have reminded us that many people are concerned about what happens before birth and after death, even if what happens before birth happens to those who will never be born and even if the near death happenings occur after death and to those who cannot care about them. The recent events involve a decision of the European Court (...) of Human Rights, a decision of the UK Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority , a proposal before the UK Parliament and a book by the most famous living German philosopher.On 8th July 2004 The European Court of Human Rights in Vo v France1 confirmed the view that the scope of legal principles protecting human individuals does not normally extend to the unborn and that in the words of the court “the unborn child is not regarded as a “person” …. (shrink)

The processes mediating dynamic and flexible responding to rapidly changing task-environments are not well understood. In the present research we employ a Stroop procedure to clarify the contribution of context-sensitive control processes to online performance. In prior work Stroop interference varied as a function of probe location context, with larger Stroop interference occurring for contexts associated with a high proportion of congruent items [Crump, M. J., Gong, Z., & Milliken, B. . The context-specific proportion congruent stroop effect: location as a (...) contextual cue. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 13, 316–321.] Here, we demonstrate that this effect does not depend on awareness of the context manipulation, but that it can depend on attention to the predictive context dimension, and on the relative salience of the target and predictive context dimensions. We discuss the implications of our results for current theories of cognitive control. (shrink)

If we are to act properly with regard to the natural world, to protect, preserve, conserve, manage or leave it alone, we need both appropriate knowledge of that world, and a sound foundation for values to guide our actions. The thesis of this paper is that scientific ecology, though some of its interpreters claim it as a 'post-modern' eco-friendly science, in fact, while perhaps not as guilty as other of its post-modern interpreters might claim of the worst excesses of 'modernism', (...) nonetheless does retain the underlying assumptions of modernism. (The 'jargon' will be further explained.) The thesis will be supported by methods drawn from phenomenology. Phenomenological enquiry can reveal and criticise the modernist assumptions, while traditional phenomenological notions, in particular Heidegger's notion of Dwelling and Merleau-Ponty's notion of the body subject, I shall suggest, might form a more eco-friendly framework for enquiring into the character of interactions within the natural world and the basis of values in those interactions. (shrink)

In La filosofia dell’arte, Giovanni Gentile assigned a prominent new role to the sentiments. This change struck some critics as a major departure from the earlier, classic accounts of actual idealism, in which Gentile argued that thought and language comprise the entirety of reality. Sentiments do not fit cleanly into a theory so narrowly concerned with thought and thinking. Their introduction, runs the objection, only compounds certain existing ambiguities in Gentile’s conception of the relation between mind and world. This article (...) describes and criticizes Gentile’s attempts to integrate feeling into actual idealism. It is argued that the appearance of feeling in his mature theory does not undermine but instead clarifies his views on the relation between thought and the act of thinking. Yet it also shows the strain under which idealist language was being put by the late 1920s. Gentile’s attempts to lay out a comprehensive and phenomenologically accurate account of how thinkers actually experience... (shrink)